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With Respect to the Yugoslav-Cominform Rift

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25X1 This summary gives observations and conclusions on the conflict
between Yugoslavia and the Cominform countries as seen from a
military-political point of view. It is divided into the fol-
lowing units:

- I. Relation of military forces
- II. Military and political estimate of the situation of
Yugoslavia
- III. Indications for and against military action by the
Cominform countries
- IV. Conclusion.

I. Relation of Military Forces1. Strength of the Armies of the Cominform Countries Around Yugoslaviaa. Soviet Troops

Area:	Combat Units:	Fighting qualities and Activities
Austria	1 Mtz Rifle Div 1 Mecz Div GHQ troops	Of great fighting power, excellently trained, amount- ing to 80 to 90 percent of war strength. Believed to be engaged in maneuvers at DOELLERSHEIM.
Western- Hungary	1 Mecz Div GHQ troops	Of same fighting power as units in Austria. Believed to be on maneuvers at Lake Balaton and possibly southeastern Hungary.
Rumania	2 Mecz Divs) 1 Tank Div } estimated (GHQ troops)	Of same fighting power as units in Austria. A contin- gent of these troops apparent- ly went to the Banat for maneu- vers in mid-August 1949.

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Bulgaria No combat units reported.
Only liaison staffs observed.

Albania No combat units reported.
Large liaison staffs, particularly of the navy
are believed to be located there.

The Soviet forces in the areas bordering on Yugoslavia are estimated at one motorized rifle division, four mechanized divisions and one tank division with GHQ troops (apparently without any major contingents of GHQ artillery). A joint high command for these forces has not been identified.

b. Armies of the Satellite Countries

Area:	Combat Units:	Fighting Qualities and Activities
Hungary	2 Inf Divs, 1 Tank Div (still in training - cadre units) Few GHQ troops	Still in the stage of initial organization; extremely low fighting qualities; fit only for operations within the country. 100 "T 34" tanks assumed. No maneu- vers reported.
Rumania	6 to 8 Inf Divs 2 Mountain Divs 1 Itz Inf Div 1 Tank Div	Fighting power still low because of lack of heavy weapons and the question- able reliability of the officer corps. "T 34" tanks and tanks of old German types. Maneuvers in the SIBIU-TARGU area, with the Rumanian 1st Tank Div par- ticipating.
Bulgaria	8 to 10 Inf Divs 3 Tank Brigs	Well disciplined but of low fighting quality for ope- rations outside the country. Armament chiefly of Soviet origin; about 200 "T 34" tanks. No information on present disposition avail- able.
Albania	Army roughly estimated at 50,000 (status of a partial mobilization), perhaps 3 Divs	Fighting qualities considered insignificant; undercover opposition within the army; no information on disposition available.

The combined strength of the armies of the satellite countries is estimated at 22 to 26 infantry divisions, one motorized infantry division and armored forces of two tank divisions. At least six divisions (those in Hungary and Albania) of these Satellite forces are assumed to have very low fighting power if employed in operations outside their home countries.

2. Air Forces of the Cominform Countries Around Yugoslavia:

a. Soviet Air Force:

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Area: Combat Aircraft: Classification as to Type:

Austria & Western Hungary (Second Air Army)	600	230 fighters 280 bombers 30 reconnaissance aircraft 60 transport aircraft
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Rumania (remainders of the Seventeenth Air Army)	300	100 fighters 200 bombers
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b. Air Forces of the Satellite Countries:

Area: Combat Aircraft: Classification as to Type:

Hungary	50 (training aircraft only)	
Rumania	95	50 fighters 45 ground attack aircraft
Bulgaria	200	80 fighters 60 ground attack aircraft 60 bombers

Czechoslovakia (aircraft may be employed against Yugoslavia)	160	140 fighters 20 bombers
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3. Yugoslav Armed Forces

a. The Yugoslav Army is estimated at 32 to 36 infantry divisions and 10 to 12 tank brigades. The army personnel is considered well-trained and mostly pro-TITO. The critical shortage of spare parts and ammunition for the heavy weapons which had been delivered by the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia prior to the Cominform crisis cannot be overcome by the Yugoslav industry, not even in a prolonged period of time. Without supply of imported ammunition and weapons, the Yugoslav army will be capable of large-scale defensive commitment for only a few months.

b. The Yugoslav Air Force is estimated at 230 fighters ("YAK-1" and "YAK-3"), 180 ground attack aircraft ("IL-2") and 120 light bombers ("PE-2"). The fighting quality of the air force is characterized by its obsolescent aircraft types, the lack of a domestic aircraft and aircraft accessory industry and its previous complete dependence on deliveries from the Soviet Union. There is no trained personnel to operate aircraft which may possibly be delivered by western countries.

4. Weighing of the Relation of Military Forces

a. The Yugoslav Army with about 35 infantry divisions and an estimated 400 tanks is confronted by pro-Cominform forces of the neighboring countries with about 25 infantry divisions and an estimated 500 tanks.

With the exception of the Danube and Tisza-River Area to the north, there are natural barriers which favor the defense of Yugoslavia. Disregarding the possibility that the Yugoslav fighting power may be decisively reduced by political defection, the armies of the Satellite countries are believed to have no chance of overthrowing the TITO-regime by military action without Soviet aid.

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With the Soviets joining the satellite countries in military operations against Yugoslavia, the strength of the army forces assembled around Yugoslavia would increase to about 30 divisions and 1,700 tanks, the excellently-trained and well-supplied Soviet forces then being of decisive importance, particularly in the event of a strong armored thrust through the Voivodina.

b. A numerical comparison between the about 450 aircraft of the satellite countries and the approximately 500 aircraft of Yugoslavia does not indicate the actual relation of fighting power because the satellite air forces will presumably receive considerable amounts of supply and possibly disguised personnel also from the Soviet Union in the event of war.

The commitment of the technically superior Soviet Air Force with its approximately 1,000 aircraft stationed in the Balkans alone would establish an absolute air superiority on the side of the Cominform forces.

c. The Soviet High Command, which will generally avoid unnecessary military risks, would presumably strengthen its forces in the Balkans (particularly its GHQ artillery and air force). Stronger forces must be expected to be employed for the security of the supply routes leading from the Soviet Union through Hungary, Rumania and possibly Bulgaria in case of a Soviet participation in military operations against Yugoslavia.

II. Military and Political Estimate of the Situation of Yugoslavia

5. Notes on the Situation of Yugoslavia

a. Yugoslavia represents a strategical key position, by the firm possession of which the SU would become a state adjacent to the Mediterranean Sea and would have access to the plain of the Po River. MOSCOW-controlled Albania would no longer be barred by Yugoslavia from land communication with the countries of the Eastern Bloc.

Seen politically, a subservient Yugoslavia would be of equal importance for the penetration of Greece and Upper Italy as would be an independent and disloyal Yugoslavia for the strengthening of the opposition in the Balkans.

Seen economically, Yugoslavia's production of copper (one fourth of the Soviet production), lead (one fifth of the Soviet production), chromium ore and bauxite, would undoubtedly contribute considerably to increase the Soviet production, though the Soviet Union does not depend on imports of raw material from Yugoslavia. As for transportation, complete, instead of the now interrupted, control over the Danube River would be of value, especially as after the opening of the communication Baltic Sea - Black Sea by the Oder-Danube Canal, the Danube River would provide an important waterway in the rear of the Eastern Bloc Front.

b. Yugoslavia's defense is militarily favored by natural obstacles on nearly all of her borders with the exception of the area of the Danube-Tisza Rivers in northern Yugoslavia. The Dinaric mountain system will facilitate a long guerilla warfare by TITO after a possible collapse as well as favor infiltration of sabotage groups and activation of partisan groups against TITO.

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Politically, the self-assured national policy of the BELGRADE Politbureau apparently managed to influence the masses of the people if not in its favor, at least against the Cominform. From TITO's speech in SKOPLJE it can be inferred that his policy influenced underground opposition groups in Bulgaria and Albania.

Yugoslavia's economic dependence upon large-scale imports of coal, oil, machinery, heavy weapons and ammunition from the countries of the Eastern Bloc is of decisive importance in the present conflict. Even without the blockade of deliveries of production from the countries of the Eastern Bloc Yugoslavia after having attained the vast goal of the 5-Year Plan in 1951 would still have to import, for example, about 750,000 tons of coal and coke to meet her peacetime needs. In addition to drilling material, a refinery capacity of nearly 200,000 tons is needed to bring about the 450,000-ton production set for 1951.

c. In view of Yugoslavia's strategical position and political importance, the Soviet Union pressed the conflict between the Cominform and Yugoslavia to such a degree that for reasons of prestige alone the Kremlin is required to liquidate TITO. An economic blockade by the Eastern Bloc against Yugoslavia will not be a success if Yugoslavia manages to obtain from the Western Powers production means, weapons and technical personnel in addition to the present imports of coal and oil. It must be to the interest of MOSCOW to solve the Yugoslav question prior to the beginning of extensive western imports and an ensuing change for the better in Yugoslavia's economic situation. Intensified activities by the Cominform are therefore to be expected in the course of this year.

6. Possibilities for the Solution of the Conflict in Favor of the Cominform

With economic aid by the Western Powers increasing, the liquidation of TITO will only be attainable by military action of the Cominform. Three possibilities and their possible effects are discussed:

a. In view of the present relation of powers and the lacking armaments industry of Yugoslavia, it is to be assumed that an attack by the Soviet and Satellite forces concentrated on Yugoslavia's borders and by some reinforcements from the Soviet Union will lead to success by the Cominform, although a long and time-consuming guerilla warfare may follow the breakdown of the Yugoslav Army. The Soviet operations plan would presumably provide for a strong main-attack army from southern Hungary and southwestern Rumania into the area of BELGRADE and a second attack group from western Hungary in the direction of FIUME to cut off the land communication with the Western Powers. A third attack group may be assigned the mission to penetrate from Bulgaria in the direction of Albania and establish a firm land connection with this country. The Soviet Union would, however, run the risk of unleashing a worldwide conflict by any direct military intervention - a risk which the Soviet leaders apparently try to avoid at present.

b. An attack by the Satellite armed forces without Soviet military intervention does not appear to be promising because of the relation of forces, the advantageous defensive position of Yugoslavia and the low morale of the attackers. As compared with the Satellite forces which would have to fight outside their countries for the benefit of the Kremlin and its largely unpopular regime, the Yugoslav forces would undoubtedly have a far superior morale and better fighting spirit. The supply situation may, in the long run, favor the Satellite forces, if Yugoslavia failed to obtain from the Western Powers military

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aid and ammunition supply.

c. Penetration of irregular Cominform forces, instigation of armed riots and large-scale sabotage acts in conjunction with military demonstrations appear to be least dangerous and political dissatisfaction favor the forming of revolutionary and sabotage groups. The copper mines near BOR and the coal mines in the Timok Valley may easily be neutralized by activities from Bulgaria. The methods and tactics of guerilla warfare may, however, prove effective only after a long time, if at all, especially as TITO's followers are seasoned partisans.

III. Indications for and against Military Action by the Cominform Countries

The most important available reports which speak for or against any of the three mentioned solutions of the conflict by military action, are summarized and briefly commented on:

7. Soviet Forces in the Balkans

a. Information favoring the assumption that the commitment of Soviet forces is intended:

Information:

Comment:

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(1) Thirty Soviet trains left the CRAIOVA-GLATINA area for TIMISOARA (P/early July 1949)

Movements are assumed to be linked with maneuvers. Maneuvers in the TIMISOARA area were also held in 1948.

(2) Marshal TOLEBUKHIN met Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian military personalities in the CRAIOVA area (P/early August 1949)

TOLEBUKHIN was CinC of the Southern Group of Forces in Rumania and Bulgaria until 1947. He was later confirmed as CinC of the Transcaucasus MD until November 1948. Although TOLEBUKHIN, being an expert in Balkan affairs, may have actually come to Rumania for conference, the information is believed to be founded on a rumor.

25X1 (3) The mass of the Soviet troops from Little Wallachia
25X1 were transferred by road and
25X1 rail to the Banat, area of
25X1 TIMISOARA-ARAD. Motor vehicles

Since rear details remained in the previous quartering areas, the troops may have left for maneuvers.

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were observed with troops going through the Transylvanian Alps (two P sources/ mid-August 1949)

The troops are believed to have gone to the Banat maneuvers.

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(4) Twelve Soviet troops trains (observed material including tanks and guns) coming from the direction of CRAIOVA, passed through SIBIU and

This information

confirms the transfer of Soviet troops from the CRAIOVA area to the Banat.

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Information:Comment:

(4) (continued)

proceeded toward ARAD
(F/13 to 21 August 1949)

(5) Part of the Soviet troops who were transferred by rail and road from Little Wallachia to the Banat after 12 August 1949 proceeded to Hungary (F/16 August 1949)

This information confirms the assumption that Soviet troops from Rumania were transferred to south-eastern Hungary (same source as that who supplied information contained in para (3)).

(6) Large-scale movements of Soviet tank units, holding maneuvers in cooperation with air force units, were seen in the CZECH area (F/16 to 22 August 1949)

The units may have come from Rumania, but may also have belonged to the 17th Gds Mecz Div from western Hungary. The maneuvers may have been intended to stage a military demonstration.

(7) Present location of the 17th Gds Mecz Div is unknown. The division was last identified in the VARPALOTA training area in mid-June 1949. Only guard details were seen at the division's military posts in early August 1949.

The division may still be located in VARPALOTA (no pertinent information has been obtained since mid-June 1949), but may also have moved south or southeast.

(8) A new Soviet division was expected to arrive in ALBA-JULIA, according to a rumor (F/24 August 1949)

The information is believed to refer to a division which is already stationed in Rumania and which is to go to the Banat for maneuvers.

b. Information contradicting the assumption that the commitment of Soviet forces is intended (see also comments on the items under para a):

(1) The Soviet forces in Austria were still reported at the troop training grounds of DOELLERSHEIM and APETLON up to mid-August 1949.

The 13th Gds Mecz Div and the 95th Gds Itz Rifle Div are still believed to be engaged in maneuvers in Austria. Owing to the lack of information for definite identification of units it is possible that one of the two divisions may have been withdrawn from Austria.

(2) A Soviet tank unit was engaged in maneuvers in Austria on 8 September 1949, according to source "Money-Mart".

It can be assumed that at least one division is still holding field exercises in Austria.

It appears improbable that new troops from the Soviet Union should have participated in the maneuvers in the Banat.

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Information:

(4) No sources reported on Soviet troop trains going to Rumania, Hungary or Bulgaria.

(5) It has not been reported that any Soviet troop units were stationed in Bulgaria.

Comment:

Despite the small amount of incoming reports it is assumed that large-scale train movements would have come to the attention of the available sources.

8. Satellite Armies

a. Information favoring the assumption that the commitment of Satellite armed forces is intended:

Information:

(1) Numerous newspapers reported on the activation in Bulgaria of a Cominform Army under the command of Marshal KONEV

(2) According to radio and press reports, the military chiefs of the Cominform countries conferred in SOFIA

(3) Large contingents of Rumanian reserve officers were inducted (several reports of July and August 1949)

(4) Marshal BULGANIN came to Bulgaria as Soviet representative to attend the National Holiday celebrations on 9 September

(5) The Polish Government cancelled its treaty of Military alliance with Yugoslavia (radio report of 9 September 1949)

Comment:

There is no way of verifying these press reports. Marshal KONEV was last confirmed as CinCof the Soviet Ground Forces in MOSCOW on 4 May 1949. Although it calls attention that he was not present on Soviet Air Force Day (17 June 1949) and on Soviet Tank Troops Day (11 September 1949), the press reports are believed to be founded on rumors.

Although this information cannot be verified it is considered a rumor.

The reported induction for a 50-day period indicates that the reserve officers were to participate in maneuvers in connection with the reserve training program.

Marshal BULGANIN's stay in SOFIA is believed to have only been part of the Cominform demonstration against Yugoslavia. Having been relieved as Minister of the Armed Forces, BULGANIN retained only the positions of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Member of the Politbureau.

Polish measure will possibly be taken by all other Satellite countries.

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b. Information contradicting the assumption that the commitment of Satellite armed forces is intended:

The available reports covering the period from July to late August 1949 do not contain any indication as to a strategic concentration of the Satellite armies in Rumania and Hungary. Yugoslavia's hesitation to present its case to the United Nations Security Council may be interpreted as an indication that the Yugoslav Government has not received any reports on large-scale troop concentrations at the Yugoslav borders.

9. Commitment of Irregular Forces, Instigation of Riots and Conduct of Sabotage Activities

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In addition to the mentioned reports there are numerous newspaper reports that members of the German Soviet Zone Police were recruited and shipped away and that the support to the Greek rebels lessened. These reports are also indicative of the intended activation of irregular Communist forces. Various warnings by Yugoslav Ministers of sabotage acts against the communication system and industrial installations prove that the Yugoslav Government is expecting such actions. Marshal BULGANIN's speech in SOFIA on 9 September 1949 contained a hint at an intended overthrow of TITO by activities inside Yugoslavia.

IV. Conclusion:

Available information and observations indicate that the Soviet Government intends to soon liquidate TITO but does not intend to employ other than irregular forces. A political war of nerves and military demonstrations will presumably also be carried on. Should these measures prove ineffectual and Yugoslavia's economy quickly recover by the aid of the Western Powers, the Soviets

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would possibly be induced to later commit regular forces. The Kremlin meets this possibility by delaying the conclusion of the Austrian state treaty and the resulting continued occupation in the Balkans. The attitude of the Soviet Union on the United Nations General Assembly which begins on 21 September 1949, will give valuable indications for the judgement of the further development.

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